A post by Seth Goldwasser
Philosophy of imagination has a unity problem. Really, it has four unity problems. I discuss one of them in my (2024): the Unity-in-Multiplicity (UM) problem is that of providing a metaphysical account of imagination that explains how it fulfills its purported explanatory roles across a diverse range of behaviors like pretense, engagement with fiction, mindreading, and tasks thought to require sensory imagery. Here I raise the “Multiplicity-in-Unity” (MU) problem. The problem is that of providing an account that accommodates apparent heterogeneity, i.e., multiplicity, discovered in the course of empirically investigating imagination in cognitive neuroscience. An account that solves the MU problem, first, identifies the dimensions along which such investigation uncovers apparent multiplicity and shows how those dimensions are metaphysically inseparable and, second, makes those dimensions thus unified empirically tractable, supporting successful inductive inferences as well as the construction of apt models or mechanistic explanations and yielding successful predictions. A theory is well-poised to solve the problem if it shows how such dimensions are metaphysically inseparable and makes them empirically tractable but hasn’t been used to support the relevant inferences or the construction of the relevant models/mechanistic explanations and its predictions haven’t been tested.
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