A report by Jill Cumby

The quest for imagination domination continues with the third annual C.O.V.I.D. (Conference [Online/Virtual] for Imagination Domination). This was a pre-read, online conference. From various time zones and sometimes with pets, conference participants met on Zoom for commentaries and discussion on six previously circulated papers that showcased progress on perennial and relatively novel topics in the imagination literature. Read on for a report of the proceedings. A more detailed schedule can be found here.

The first paper of the conference raises the question of how to understand the relationship between imagining (a mental activity) and imaginings (mental states). Focusing on the simulation theory of mindreading and theories of representational art, Roelofs argues that there are cases of imagining in which a key role is played by states that are not (or not only) imaginings, at least as these are typically understood (there are many ways to understand imaginings: as recreations or “offline copies” of other mental states, as involving mental imagery, etc.) Roelofs introduces reuse imagination, or the ability to take one’s existing mental states (ordinary beliefs, desires, perceptions, etc.) and reuse them for new purposes, to explain what is going on in these cases. Roelofs compares reuse imagination and other types of imagination and discusses whether these repurposed mental states are properly thought of as imaginings.

The idea of reuse is similar to the idea of repurposing that appears in Aronowitz’s paper. Aronowitz focuses on the story of the Golem to show how stories are repurposed and argues that the communal practice of storytelling provides a model for understanding individual cognition. Aronowitz is interested in the afterlife of observations, or how we can go back to experiences stored in memory in ways that are independent of their primary use to find resources that can help us to meet our present epistemic aims. Repurposing is a distinct way of learning from the past that encompasses memory, imagining, and analogical reasoning.

Speaking of learning from the past, Hasidi’s talk returns to the writings of Suhrawardi, a 12th century Sufi philosopher, for insights on the imagination. Hasidi shows that for Suhrawardi, imagination has a primary rather than secondary epistemic role in that it makes accessible a unique set of objects that are unavailable to perception and reason. Hasidi explains how Suharwardi’s theory of the imagination is unlike those of many writers in the Western canon who have written as though an epistemic agent with idealized capacities for perception and rational insight would have no need for imagination.

A central aim of imagination research is to better understand the norms or constraints to which imaginative activity is subject and the next two papers discussed expand this research in interesting ways. Barner argues that imaginings are, on some occasions, mental actions that are under agentive control and as such, are subject to moral norms (in addition to the more widely recognized epistemic and pragmatic norms). Barner presents cases of morally right imaginings to support this claim and argues that judgments about which imaginative activities are morally right are best captured by a consequentialist account of morality. 

Van Leeuwen treated conference participants to a preview of a chapter from a book that is nearing completion. His paper discussed the Puzzle of Religious Rationality and emphasized the way in which distinct cognitive attitudes are subject to different constraints. To illustrate: If I imagine that my kitchen pantry is a portal to a hidden universe with chocolate fountains and gingerbread houses, I do not thereby fall into irrationality in the way that I would if I were to believe that my kitchen pantry is a portal to the same hidden universe. Norms that govern how ordinary factual beliefs are updated do not govern imaginings. Van Leeuwen shows how this is relevant to solving the Puzzle of Religious Rationality which asks for an explanation of how it is that seemingly rational people can have seemingly irrational religious beliefs. Van Leeuwen suggests that religious ‘beliefs’ are based in a distinct cognitive attitude with its own set of constraints and argues that the distinct attitude solution to the Puzzle of Religious Rationality is more successful than existing proposals for solving the puzzle.

All of this focus on imagination invites the question: is it possible to imagine too much? Ortiz- Hinojosa’s paper helps us to think through possible answers to this question. Ortiz-Hinojosa examines recent proposals that categorize excessive or maladaptive daydreaming as a mental disorder. Starting with a close examination of case studies, Ortiz-Hinojosa examines this question from the perspective of different diagnostic models and considers some ontological and ethical concerns with pathologizing daydreaming. (In a healthy sign of self-reflexivity, the discussion of maladaptive daydreaming eventually turned to the question of whether there was a concept of maladaptive philosopher somewhere in the vicinity, but I’ll let you imagine this creature for yourself).

I would like to thank the authors, commentators, and organizers for making this conference such a pleasure to attend. I’m looking forward to seeing how research develops on the issues discussed and already imagining the next C.O.V.I.D!