A post by Janine Jones

There seems to be a general consensus that imagining — sometimes thought of as seeing with the mind’s eye — is inherently representational. How could re-presenting to ‘the mind’s eye’ what is not present fail to involve a representation of that which is presently absent. Isn’t such a form of representation at the heart of what it is to imagine?

In this post, I take advantage of the bounteous nature of junkyards. I participate in a form of engagement that both philosophy and junkyards invite:  wondering and wandering. I wonder as I wander through the junkyard trying to imagine how what I am trying to imagine could be in the junkyard. I am trying to discover a type of imagining, in the junkyard, that bears representational constituents (perhaps even necessarily so), but which is, itself, non-representational, at least at the non-sub-personal level.