Some Recent Work on Imagination

Essay writing... by Morten Oddvik, CC BY 2.0 via Flickr

Essay writing... by Morten Oddvik, CC BY 2.0 via Flickr

Below we list some scholarly works on imagination that have been published since our previous update.  Please feel free to add additional references in the comments!

(Newly updated as of 5:30 pm Pacific Time on February 12 — and we have also added some forthcoming works at the end.)

* * *

Virtue, emotion and imagination in law and legal reasoning. Amalia Amaya and Maksymillian Del Mar, eds.

What is the role and value of virtue, emotion and imagination in law and legal reasoning? These new essays, by leading scholars of both law and philosophy, offer striking and exploratory answers to this neglected question. The collection takes a holistic approach, inquiring as to the connections and relations between virtue, emotion and imagination. In addition to the principal focus on adjudication, essays in the collection also engage with a variety of different legal, political and moral contexts: eg criminal law sentencing, the Black Lives Matter movement and professional ethics. A number of different areas of the law are addressed (eg criminal law, constitutional law and tort law) and the issues explored include: the benefits and limits of empathy in legal reasoning; the role of attention and perception in judicial reasoning;, the identification of judicial virtues (such as compassion and humility) and judicial vices (such as callousness and partiality); the values and dangers of certain imaginative devices (eg personification); and the interactive and social dimensions of virtue, emotion and imagination. The section devoted primarily to imagination includes papers by Amy Kind, Adam Morton, Simon Stern, and Maks Del Mar.

The two faces of mental imagery.  Margherita Arcangeli.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception‐like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception‐like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.

Pushing the boundaries of reality: Science fiction, creativity, and the moral imagination. Jessica E. Black and Jennifer L. Barnes. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts.

Past research suggests that reading science fiction (sci-fi) correlates not only with a propensity to think the impossible could become possible, but also with a tendency to say that morally taboo actions could be permissible in some circumstances (Black, Capps, & Barnes, 2018). Here, in a preregistered experimental study, we tested the immediate effects of exposure to sci-fi TV shows on moral imagination and creativity. Although there were no main effects of viewing sci-fi (compared to viewing realistic TV and a control), we found an interaction between condition and narrative engagement: in the sci-fi group only, participants who reported feeling less transported into the story tended to subsequently generate fewer scenarios in which normally taboo acts would be morally permissible (compared with highly transported individuals in the sci-fi group as well as both the control and realistic TV show groups). The same pattern of results held for creativity: there was a significant interaction between condition and narrative engagement, such that there was an effect of transportation only for those who watched sci-fi, with participants who were more transported into the sci-fi narrative generating more unique uses for a common object than those who experienced low transportation into sci-fi. This pattern of results is discussed with respect to the cognitive demands of engaging with science fiction.

A common frame for formal imagination.  Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas & M. Elena Rodríguez.  Minds and Machines.

In this paper, we review three influential theories of imagination in order to understand how the dynamics of imagination acts could be modeled using formal languages. While reviewing them, we notice that they are not detailed enough to account for all the mechanisms involved in creating and developing imaginary worlds. We claim those theories could be further refined into what we call the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, which defines a framework that can be used to study the dynamics of imagination using formal languages, and we support our claim by showing how the framework allows to model certain imagination acts step by step. Then, we introduce the Rhombus of Imagination, which is a visual tool that can be used in conjunction with our framework to study the procedural structure of different kinds of imagination acts and identify their dynamic properties.

The logic of imagination acts:  A formal system for the dynamics of imaginary worlds. Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas & M. Elena Rodríguez.  Erkenntnis.

Imagination has received a great deal of attention in different fields such as psychology, philosophy and the cognitive sciences, in which some works provide a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in the creation and elaboration of imaginary worlds. Although imagination has also been formalized using different logical systems, none of them captures those dynamic mechanisms. In this work, we take inspiration from the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, that identifies the different processes involved in the creation of imaginary worlds, and we use it to define a dynamic formal system called the Logic of Imagination Acts. We build our logic by using a possible-worlds semantics, together with a new set of static and dynamic modal operators. The role of the new dynamic operators is to call different algorithms that encode how the formal model is expanded in order to capture the different mechanisms involved in the creation and development of imaginary worlds. We provide the definitions of the language, the semantics and the algorithms, together with an example that shows how the model is expanded. By the end, we discuss some interesting features of our system, and we point out to possible lines of future work.

Imagining in response to fiction:  unpacking the infrastructure.  Alon Chasid.  Philosophical Explorations.

Works of fiction are alleged to differ from works of nonfiction in instructing their audience to imagine their content. Indeed, works of fiction have been defined in terms of this feature: they are works that mandate us to imagine their content. This paper examines this definition of works of fiction, focusing on the nature of the activity that ensues in response to reading or watching fiction. Investigating how imaginings function in other contexts, I show, first, that they presuppose a cognitive infrastructure encompassing at least one additional kind of mental state, whose role is to determine, to some degree, truth in an imaginary world. I then discuss the implications for the definition of fiction, showing that the definition should be refined to accommodate the structure that imagining presupposes: a work counts as fiction just in case it mandates us, not only to imagine, but to engage in a more complex mental activity, an activity that in addition to imagining, involves positing a backdrop for our imaginings.

Imagination cannot justify empirical belief.  Jonathan Egeland.  Episteme.

A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can help us take advantage of justification that we already have, thereby enabling us to form new doxastically justified beliefs. More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition – which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification – but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position.

Imagery and possibility.  Dominic Gregory.  Noûs.

We often ascribe possibility to the scenes that are displayed by mental or nonmental sensory images. The paper presents a novel argument for thinking that we are prima facie justified in ascribing metaphysical possibility to what is displayed by suitable visual images, and it argues that many of our imagery‐based ascriptions of metaphysical possibility are therefore prima facie justified. Some potential objections to the arguments are discussed, and some potential extensions of them, to cover nonvisual forms of imagery and nonmetaphysical forms of possibility, are endorsed.

Keeping the imagination epistemically useful in the face of bias.  Madeleine Hyde.  Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.

The imagination is often treated as epistemically useless in comparison with other sensory states like visual perceptual experiences. A deeper look into what kind of beliefs imagining can and cannot justify indicates that the story is more complicated than this. Under certain constraints, it appears that the imagination can be put to good epistemic use, justifying beliefs based on its content in a way comparable with perceptual experience. However, as can also be the case in perceptual experiences, imaginative states are subject to being negatively influenced by biases, which skew the content and ‘downgrade’ the state epistemically. I aim to show how such effects can be combatted. With a certain kind of epistemic responsibility in place, the ideal imagining agent can notice the influence of bias on their imaginative episodes, stop believing the relevant unjustified beliefs and reconfigure their imaginative episode to better represent not only what is metaphysically possible, but what is a live possibility for them right now. The result is not only that the imagination is indeed epistemically useful, but in ways that up till now have remained relatively unexplored.

Imagination and belief in action. Anna Ichino. Philosophia.

Imagination and belief are obviously different. Imagining that you have won the lottery is not quite the same as believing that you have won. But what is the difference? According to a standard view in the contemporary debate, they differ in two key functional respects. First, with respect to the cognitive inputs to which they respond: imaginings do not respond to real-world evidence as beliefs do. Second, with respect to the behavioural outputs that they produce: imaginings do not motivate us to act as beliefs do. I argue that this view is mistaken in one important respect. The distinction between imagination and belief does lie at the functional level; but the relevant functional difference does not concern behavioural outputs – since, in spite of appearances, imaginings and beliefs motivate us to act (and react) in the same ways. To see the difference, we need to focus on the inputs side – and, relatedly, on the sorts of inferential relations that imaginings and beliefs bear to each other. I show that this view does not have the absurd consequences that it may prima facie seem to have; on the contrary, it has important implications for our understanding of how the mind works.

Mary’s powers of imagination.  Amy Kind.  In Sam Coleman, ed., The Knowledge Argument.

One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis.  Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature.  Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red.  For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities.  Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim.  Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like.  To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much.  Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it.  My argument depends on the distinction between the ability to imagine red and the ability to imagine red correctly, a distinction that I take to be crucial for understanding the nature of imagination.  Fleshing out this distinction not only helps to clarify Mary’s epistemic situation but also helps to shed light on arguments related to the knowledge argument such as Nagel’s bat argument.

Towards a pluralist account of the imagination in science.  Alice Murphy.  Philosophy of Science.

Typically, the imagination in thought experiments has been taken to consist in mental images; we visualise the state of affairs described. A recent alternative maintains that it is only the propositional imagination that is necessary for the conduct of a thought experiment (Salis and Frigg forthcoming). I set out problems with these monistic accounts, and develop a pluralist stance. Thought experiments appeal to a variety of our imaginative capacities and we ought to focus on the function of particular thought experiments when considering what type of imaginative engagement they invite.

Imaginative resistance and variation. Eric Peterson. British Journal of Aesthetics.

Imaginative resistance is roughly a phenomenon that is characterized by either an inability or an unwillingness to imagine some proposition. It has been noted that this phenomenon varies from person to person and from context to context. Most philosophers account for this variation by appealing to contextual factor (i.e., genres). While such accounts make progress, I argue that the variation outruns the use of such a tactic. I propose a new account that can explain all of the variation.

Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination.  Michael T. Stuart.  Synthese.

Sometimes we learn through the use of imagination. The epistemology of imagination asks how this is possible. One barrier to progress on this question has been a lack of agreement on how to characterize imagination; for example, is imagination a mental state, ability, character trait, or cognitive process? This paper argues that we should characterize imagination as a cognitive ability, exercises of which are cognitive processes. Following dual process theories of cognition developed in cognitive science, the set of imaginative processes is then divided into two kinds: one that is unconscious, uncontrolled, and effortless, and another that is conscious, controlled, and effortful. This paper outlines the different epistemological strengths and weaknesses of the two kinds of imaginative process, and argues that a dual process model of imagination helpfully resolves or clarifies issues in the epistemology of imagination and the closely related epistemology of thought experiments.

Characterizing the imaginative attitude.  Nick Wiltsher.  Philosophical Papers.

Three thoughts strongly influence recent work on sensory imagination, often without explicit articulation. The image thought says that all mental states involving a mental image are imaginative. The attitude thought says that, if there is a distinctive imaginative attitude, it is a single, monolithic attitude. The function thought says that the functions of sensory imagination are identical or akin to functions of other mental states such as judgment or belief. Taken together, these thoughts create a theoretical context within which eliminativism appears attractive. Eliminativism is the idea that we need not refer to a distinctive attitude in order to characterize sensory imagination: the attitudes involved in other states provide all the resources we need. Peter Langland-Hassan’s account of sensory imagination provides an example of such eliminativism. Via close examination of this account, I make manifest the three thoughts and their collective tendency to support eliminativism. I argue that all three are dubious, and that we should reject eliminativism; we need a distinctive imaginative attitude if we are to adequately explicate sensory imagination.

Imagination:  A lens, not a mirror.  Nick Wiltsher.  Philosophers’ Imprint.

The terms "imagination'' and "imaginative'' can be readily applied to a profusion of attitudes, experiences, activities, and further phenomena. The heterogeneity of the things to which they're applied prompts the thoughts that the terms are polysemous, and that there is no single, coherent, fruitful conception of imagination to be had. Nonetheless, much recent work on imagination ascribes implicitly to a univocal way of thinking about imaginative phenomena: the imitation theory, according to which imaginative experiences imitate other experiences. This approach is infelicitous. It issues in unhelpful descriptions of imaginative activities, experiences, and attitudes, and frustrates theorizing about imagination's applications and intensional characteristics. A better way of thinking about imagination is the lens theory, according to which the imagination is a set of ways to focus, refine, clarify or concentrate the matter of other experiences. This approach offers better characterizations of imaginative phenomena, and promises brighter theoretical illumination of them.

Olfactory imagery: is exactly what it smells like.  Benjamin D. Young.  Philosophical Studies.

Mental Imagery, whereby we experience aspect of a perceptual scene or perceptual object in the absence of direct sensory stimulation is ubiquitous. Often the existence of mental imagery is demonstrated by asking one’s reader to volitionally generate a visual object, such as closing ones eyes and imagining an apple. However, mental imagery also arises in auditory, tactile, interoceptive, and olfactory cases. A number of influential philosophical theories have attempted to explain mental imagery in terms of belief-based forms of representation using the Dependence Thesis, dependence upon means of access, such as enactivism, or in terms of the similarity of content with perceptual processing. The focus of this paper concerns the later approach and in particular assessing if Nanay’s promissory note that his theory is applicable to modalities other than vision, such as smell, seems likely to be of theoretical tender. The thesis argued for in this paper is that olfactory imagery exists and is best accounted for by considering it as a type of perceptual processing with a unique representational format relative to the olfactory perceptual modality. The paper concludes by summarizing the applicability of Nanay’s theory of mental imagery for olfaction and suggests some further issues that arise when transitioning to multi-modal mental imagery.

FORTHCOMING WORKS

Belief-like imagining and correctness. Alon Chasid. American Philosophical Quarterly.

This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, ‘mimic’ beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content.

Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity. Alon Chasid and Assaf Weksler. Philosophical Psychology.

A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like imaginings. Lastly, we will explain why it is that when belief-like imaginings—as opposed to beliefs (and other cognitive states)—penetrate visual experience, they render visual experiences non-assertoric.

Knowing and imagining. Greg Currie.

Works of fiction are works of the imagination and for the imagination. Gregory Currie energetically defends the familiar idea that fictions are guides to the imagination, a view which has come under attack in recent years. Responding to a number of challenges to this standpoint, he argues that within the domain of the imagination there lies a number of distinct and not well-recognized capacities which make the connection between fiction and imagination work. Currie then considers the question of whether in guiding the imagination fictions may also guide our beliefs, our outlook, and our habits in directions of learning. It is widely held that fictions very often provide opportunities for the acquisition of knowledge and of skills. Without denying that this sometimes happens, this book explores the difficulties and dangers of too optimistic a picture of learning from fiction. It is easy to exaggerate the connection between fiction and learning, to ignore countervailing tendencies in fiction to create error and ignorance, and to suppose that claims about learning from fiction require no serious empirical support. Currie makes a case for modesty about learning from fiction--reasoning that a lot of what we take to be learning in this area is itself a kind of pretence, that we are too optimistic about the psychological and moral insights of authors, that the case for fiction as a Darwinian adaptation is weak, and that empathy is both hard to acquire and not always morally advantageous.

Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication. Maksymillian Del Mar.

What is the value of fictions, metaphors, figures and scenarios in adjudication? This book develops three models to help answer that question: inquiry, artefacts and imagination. Drawing on a broad range of theoretical traditions – including philosophy of imagination and emotion, the theory and history of rhetoric, and the cognitive humanities – this book offers an interdisciplinary defence of the importance of artefactual language and imagination in adjudication.