Gerson is a philosopher at the University of Giessen (Germany) and works mainly on problems in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and the philosophy of language. For a few years he has also been trying to better understand the nature of imagination and its role in our lives.
A post by Gerson Reuter
In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have argued for the claim that sensory imaginings can justify, in an irreducible way, not only modal beliefs but also contingently true beliefs about the world.[1] I agree with this claim. (At least, I hope it’s true.) At the same time, however, I am sceptical as to the success of existing attempts to demonstrate the epistemic potential of imaginings. In the following, I would like to present some thoughts on a promising proposal made by Joshua Myers (2021). My considerations are rather sceptical. But since I hope that it can be shown that imaginings can be justifiers, I would be glad to learn that there is no need to be sceptical in this regard.
Sometimes we give free rein to our imagination, perhaps leaning back and indulging in daydreams; sometimes, however, we try – and occasionally seem to succeed in – imagining what is actually the case in the world. For example, when we try on shoes in a store, we may go through our wardrobe in our mind and, thanks to this use of our imagination, find out whether the colour of the shoes matches our favourite trousers. In such cases, we deliberately let our imagination operate under a reality constraint (Kind 2016): Our imaginings are supposed to be true. That much is reasonably uncontroversial. Accordingly, Myers’s proposal starts with what are in fact widely shared assumptions:
(i) We have mental states, such as beliefs and memories, that are apt to constrain those imaginings that aim at truthfully representing what is the case.
(ii) Thanks to employing suitable constraints, we are able to successfully represent in our imagination what is the case.
To illustrate (i) and (ii) with Myers’s example: Imagine that you are about to take an airplane trip and ask yourself whether your pieces of luggage fit into the overhead compartment of the airplane. Of course, you want it to be the case that they are small enough – and the compartment large enough. Now, suppose that this wish causes you to imagine that your luggage fits into the compartment. In this case, we have no reason to think that your imagination justifies you in believing that the luggage actually fits into the compartment. For the ‘constraint’ was ultimately merely the wish that it be so. (In fact, it wasn’t a ‘reality constraint’ at all.)
The situation is supposed to be different, however, if a justified belief about the dimensions of your luggage (and the dimensions of the compartment) constrains your imagination. In this case, your resulting imagining can in turn justify your belief that the luggage does indeed fit up there, or at least that’s the idea.
Myers specifies the epistemic merits of such constraints for the epistemic role of our imaginings – only hinted at by (i) and (ii) – with two further claims. And they are likely to make things more contentious (and interesting, of course):
(iii) If the beliefs (or memories) that constrain our imaginings are justified, the imaginings constrained by them are (or at least can be) justified thanks to these beliefs being justified – and can then justify further beliefs about the world.
(iv) Imaginings endowed with epistemic power in such a way can play an independent justifying role (not the constraints but the imaginings themselves justify our beliefs).
In what follows, I will concentrate on claim (iii). What exactly is the role of the constraints in question? It seems to me that these constraints on our imaginings – in the example given, the beliefs about the dimensions of the luggage and the compartment – serve as instructions about what we want to (or should) imagine. In order for the imaginings produced in carrying them out to be able to justify our beliefs, these instructions must themselves be appropriate, of course – in our example: I should have (roughly?) true (and justified) beliefs about the dimensions of the luggage and the compartment. However, epistemically crucial seems to be whether, in imagining the relevant state of affairs, I carry out these instructions appropriately. What is the use of these beliefs if I screw up the imaginings?
Perhaps one might think that Myers’s considerations should be read more weakly. After all, he writes explicitly:
This suggests the following necessary condition on imaginative justification:
The Justificatory Force Condition: The justificatory force of an imagining is determined, at least in part, by the justificatory force of its constrainers. (3258, italics mine, GR)
So maybe the claim is merely to have identified a necessary condition (of presumably several necessary conditions) for an imagining to have justifying power. I’m not objecting to that claim here; for all I’ve said, it may well be correct. Instead, my worry is that this necessary condition doesn’t take us much closer to an explanation of the epistemic power of imaginings. Moreover, this weak reading collides with passages in Myers’s text such as the following:
According to the proposal I favor, imaginings justify beliefs in virtue of themselves being epistemically justified. (3261, italics mine, GR)
In short, my answer is that imaginings come to have an epistemic status by being based on evidence (3264, italics mine, GR)
This sounds as if the epistemic value of the beliefs that guide our imaginings is supposed to be responsible for the epistemic value of these imaginings – alternatively put, as if it is supposed to explain the epistemic value of our imaginings. Although it may be plausible that an explanation of the epistemic value of our imaginings has to take into account the epistemic status of the constraining beliefs, it seems clear to me that the crucial part of the explanation is still missing. If, as in the above example, we have true and justified beliefs about the dimensions of the objects in question and intend to let exactly these beliefs guide our imaginings, then it is still an open question whether or not the resulting imaginings represent the real relations adequately. Whether we succeed seems to depend on how good we are at imagining something we want to imagine![2]
If these considerations are on the right track, two consequences seem to emerge: First of all, the epistemic value of constraints probably doesn’t explain how imaginings can have epistemic power. Or at least, the core of such an explanation would still be missing. Secondly, these considerations might also (very tentatively) point to an answer to the question under what conditions imaginings can justify our beliefs about the world. They can justify them if our imaginings – in certain situations, given certain tasks – are reliable. So, do we need a reliability theory of justification for the fascinating and puzzling skill of imagination? Our imagination, however, doesn’t seem to be very reliable, at least not in many situations in the face of many tasks…. Presumably, we have to exercise our imagination before it can be a really reliable process for acquiring true beliefs.[3]
Notes
[1] In this post, I exclusively talk about sensory (or ‘quasi perceptual’) imaginings such as visualizations.
[2] By the way, Myers himself writes – without elaborating, however – that the beliefs in question must properly constrain the imagining (see 3252). This remark hints at what seems to be epistemologically crucial.
[3] Many thanks to Serena Gregorio, Lukas Lewerentz, and Matthias Vogel for their comments on my ideas for this post.
References
Kind, Amy (2016): “Imagination under constraints,” in: A. Kind & P. Kung (eds.): Knowledge Through Imagination, Oxford: Oxford UP, 145-59.
Myers, Joshua (2021): “The Epistemic Status of the Imagination,” Philosophical Studies 178 (10), 3251-3270.