Merel Semeijn is a postdoctoral researcher interested in philosophy and semantics of fiction. She just finished her Rubicon project Let’s stop talking about Holmes: Philosophy of fiction beyond novels at Institut Jean Nicod in Paris. In January 2025, Merel will start her Veni project Fact, fiction and deception in the digital age: A formal semantic exploration of impure discourses at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.
A post by Merel Semeijn
“Should we put Santa Claus on the ‘naughty list’?” Last Christmas, Nursery World (a childcare magazine) asked this question to an interdisciplinary panel, including James Mahon, a philosopher of deception. Mahon’s answer was a clear “yes”:
“Santa Claus is not a fictional character. Santa Claus is a lie character. There’s an important difference. Harry Potter is a fictional character. Children are not supposed to believe that Harry Potter exists. But children are supposed to believe Santa Claus exists.”
Lying, for Mahon, is naughty, making Christmas a “tainted holiday”. He urges adults to stop lying to children, and to turn Santa into a fictional character instead.
I partly agree with Mahon. He is right to correct anyone who mistakenly categorizes Santa as a fictional character. Hark now, however… Santa is also not a ‘lie character’. Santa is a ‘hoax character’!
Analytic philosophers of fiction and deception have thus far not paid much attention to hoaxing. (Maybe because we’re already experiencing enough difficulties as it is, trying to define ‘pure’ cases of lying and fiction in two-party discourses (cf. Dynel, 2016).) Media scholars have, however, and their findings are not only very interesting… they can help us better understand Santa.
The term ‘hoax’ has both a broad and a narrow meaning. On its broad meaning, the term ‘hoax’ is used for any kind of mass deception. A book such as Frey’s A Million Little Pieces (initially published as a non-fictional autobiography, but later unmasked as partly fabricated) is thus a hoax on this broad understanding of the term. On the narrow meaning of the term – the one I am interested in – a hoax is a deceptive act “that is intended to be discovered” (Fleming & O’Carrol, 2010). Presumably, Frey did not intend for his deception to be discovered. Hence A Million Little Pieces is not a hoax on the narrow understanding of the term. But what kind of deception is intended to be discovered?
Remember The Blair Witch Project? This documentary-style horror movie features signs of supernatural evil, but was initially released as non-fictional through an extensive online advertising campaign, causing uncertainty and disagreement amongst audience members about its non-fictional status. The Blair Witch Project is a quintessential hoax: it worked so well precisely because it managed to deceive part of its audience. Yet the producers (seeking recognition for their successful ‘prank’) presumably also intended this deception to eventually be overtly recognized.
Let’s return to less horrific topics more suitable for a Christmas blogpost. I suggest that Santa (and his friends Sinterklaas, the Tooth Fairy, the Easter Bunny, etc.) are also hoaxes (on the narrow meaning of the term). The practice surrounding Santa involves intentional deception of certain gullible people (i.e., young children), but this deception is also meant to eventually be discovered (i.e., it is no parent’s intention that their child continues to believe that Santa exists right into adulthood).
At this point you may rightly wonder: Ok, but is a (verbal) hoax not just a lie? On the, according to Mahon, most widely accepted definition of lying, “[t]o lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another person with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true” (Mahon, 2016). A mother who says p to her child:
p. Santa has a biiig belly that shakes when he laughs!
does not herself believe that p. Yet, she intends to deceive her child into believing that p. It’s beginning to look a lot like a regular lie…
Literature in media studies offers us several insights on how hoaxing differs from lying (e.g., a hoax involves mass deception, a hoax is meant to entertain and/or educate). Most relevantly (to the philosopher interested in defining speech acts), several authors argue that hoaxing has distinct success conditions from lying:
(1) A successful hoax creates a split in its audience (e.g., Fredal, 2014; Packard, 2021). For a hoax to work and receive appropriate recognition, some audience members must be deceived (i.e., take the discourse as factual), while others are ‘in the know’ (i.e., take the discourse as non-factual).
(2) A successful hoax involves mere temporary deception (e.g., Fredal, 2014; Fleming & O’Carroll, 2010). Unlike the stereotypical lie, a hoax is unsuccessful if the audience remains forever deceived. The hoaxer intends the audience to eventually discover the truth. (I suggest that this is different from a lie with a ‘sunset clause’ (Mahon, p.c.) where the liar intends to eventually reveal the truth through some additional communicative act.)
How do we translate these insights back into the familiar lingo of philosophy of fiction and deception? Going with insight (1), we might try to define the hoaxer as someone who performs two speech acts (with two distinct audiences) simultaneously, i.e., a deceptive lie towards those who are not in the know (e.g., the children), and a fictional statement towards those who are in the know (e.g., other adults).
Wait. What’s this? Sure, you are lying towards those that are deceived… but why would it be a fictional statement towards those that are in the know?
Consider Christmas morning in a household with a mother, a 6-year-old, and an 11-year-old. They are discussing Santa (usually portrayed by uncle Leroy). Whereas the 6-year-old is deceived and believes that Santa exists, the 11-year-old and her mother are (mutually) in the know. Suppose, again, that mother says p (“Santa has a biiig belly…”). The 11-year-old responds with q:
q. Oh yeah! It’s even bigger than uncle Leroy’s belly!
and winks at her annoyed mother. When they all hear the (agreed-upon) banging on the door and Leroy’s ho ho ho!’s, mother and 11-year-old act surprised and excited, to match the 6-year-old’s real surprise and excitement.
The collective pretense by the 11-year-old and her mother (their discourse, facial expressions, etc.) is deceptive towards the 6-year-old. However, between mother and 11-year-old, this is non-deceptive pretense (they are not trying to deceive each other that p, or that q, or that they believe that p, or that they are really surprised, etc.). Non-deceptive pretense has been argued to be the hallmark of fiction by figures such as MacDonald (1954) and Searle (1975). Can we speak of a ‘fiction’ occurring (and likewise of p and q as constituting fictional discourse) between those that are in the know? This, of course, is going to depend on our understanding of ‘fiction’, i.e., whether we allow for a flexible notion that can be relativized to a proper subset of the interlocutors of some discourse. The ‘split discourse-analysis’ (or insight (1)) does seem to push us in this direction.
This analysis explains why we associate Santa both with fiction, and with lying. In interactions amongst adults Santa is indeed a fictional character. In interactions between adults and children, Santa is a lie character. Some may forget this latter aspect of Santa, especially since the non-deceptive pretense between adults often continues (in some form or other) long after there are no children (i.e., potential hoax victims) left in the vicinity. What this analysis does not do, however, is account for insight (2). On the above analysis, any kind of collective deception of some third party counts as a hoax, also if the deception is permanent. But the ‘lie’ in the hoax is special: It involves the non-stereotypical intention to eventually be discovered.
In future work I want to explore how to account for both (1) and (2) in defining hoaxing. I do not have the space (nor do I have fully fleshed-out ideas) to give an adequate analysis here. Still, as a special Christmas treat, I’ll provide a preview of my thoughts (without much explanation or justification). And so, I’m offering this simple phrase to kids from one to ninety-two. Although it’s been said many times, many ways:
a initiates a hoax that p iff a does not believe that p, a communicates that p, and a intends that because of their communicative act [1] at first, some audience members are deceived into believing that p (and the deceived believe that all others also believe that p, etc.); and that [2] eventually, all audience members believe that p is merely true in some fiction/story (and believe that all others believe this, etc.)
Thus, a hoax is unsuccessful in case at least one of the intended outcomes fails to instantiate (i.e., nobody is deceived and/or some remain permanently deceived).
So… should we put Santa Claus on the naughty list? Is hoaxing better than lying? I honestly have no idea. On my analysis, hoaxing essentially involves deception, and this may make it prima facie morally objectionable. In general, however, hoaxing seems to be regarded as less naughty than lying, precisely because the deception is (also essentially) intended to be discovered. Yes, sure… we are tricking the children… but it’s just a prank!
So, to anyone that worries whether they should tell their child that Santa exists, good tidings I bring to you and your kin! You’re not lying to your children… You’re ho ho hoaxing! And that sounds a lot more festive, doesn’t it?
References
Dynel, M. Killing two birds with one deceit: Deception in multi-party interactions. International Review of Pragmatics. 2016;8:179-218.
Fleming C., O'Carroll J. The art of the hoax. Parallax. 2010;16(4):45-59.
Fredal J. The Perennial Pleasures of the Hoax. Philosophy & Rhetoric. 2014;47(1):73-97.
Macdonald, M. The Language of Fiction. Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes. 1954;28:165-196.
Mahon, J.E. The Definition of Lying and Deception. In: Edward N. Zalta, editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University; 2016.
Packard S. Waiting for the emperor's new clothes: The temporal order of the public lie. In: Fludernik M., Packard S., editors. Being untruthful: Lying, fiction and the non-factual. Baden-Baden: Ergon Verlag; 2021. p.99-120. (Faktuales und fiktionales Erzählen, Schriftenreihe des Graduiertenkollegs; 1767, Band 9).
Searle, J.R. The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse. New Literary History. 1975;6(2):319-32.