Zachary Srivastava is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati. His research interests are in the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of games.
A post by Zachary Srivastava
Over the past five to ten years, there’s been a surge of interest in the role of imagination in science, particularly since the release of The Scientific Imagination, edited by Arnon Levy and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2019). As research continues, we can return to traditional problems from the literature on imagination and philosophy of science to see if our cross-disciplinary excursions have revealed new paths to exploring old problems. The comparisons between fictional characters or stories and scientific models on fiction views of models has led me to think about the problem I was working on in a broader context: how do we gain real understanding from fictional models? The question strikes me as highly similar to Colin Radford’s (1975) “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?” and the paradox of fiction, which asks how we can justifiably be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina when we know she isn’t real. The similarity between the two questions led me to consider how the paradox of fiction could be repurposed for the philosophy of science. I call this new version the paradox of scientific fiction. This post examines both versions of the paradox, whether they’re truly posing analogous questions, and how this could shape how we think about the relationship between artistic and scientific imagination.
The paradox of fiction is typically represented by three statements that cannot all be true. Consider the following formulation of the paradox of fiction from Florian Cova and Fabrice Teroni (2016, 930):
P1. We can feel genuine emotions for fictional characters.
P2. We do not believe that fictional characters exist.
P3. To feel genuine emotions, we must believe that these emotions are directed at actually existing objects.
There are a few modifications needed in order to shift the paradox to concern scientific fictions. First, rather than consider emotions, I propose considering epistemic reactions. The phrasing is intentionally vague and chosen to be neutral in the debate about the aims of science when considering potential solutions to the paradox. Second, fictional characters are replaced with scientific fictions; by which I mean things that are scientifically useful, but known to be untrue, such as idealized representations, thought experiments, models, simulations, and the like. There are ongoing debates in the literature over the status of fictions in science (Toon, 2010; Levy, 2012; Frigg & Nguyen, 2016; Thomasson, 2020; Salis, 2021). This too, seems to be relevant to how the paradox might be resolved, so again neutral language is preferable. So, the paradox of scientific fiction can be articulated as follows:
P1.* We have genuine epistemic reactions to fictional objects.
P2.* We do not believe that fictional objects exist.
P3.* To achieve genuine epistemic reactions, we must believe the object of understanding actually exists.
The most pressing question to consider is whether these two paradoxes are really posing the same question. There are two main challenges that are worth considering. First, do the paradox of fiction and paradox of scientific fiction consider the same sense of fiction? If they do not, then it would cast doubt on whether we are dealing with the same kind of imagining. Second, is the broad notion of epistemic reactions the right substitute for emotions? As I will explain in more detail below, I think our focus should be on scientific understanding, but this also seems to bias us towards a particular type of solution.
The first question to consider is what we mean by fiction. Colin Radford (1975) asks: why are we moved by the fate of Anna Karenina when we know she isn’t real? From this, we might conclude that fictional characters are the sort of fiction Radford has in mind. This is in line with the majority of fiction views of scientific models. However, in “The New Fiction View of Models”, Fiora Salis (2021) provides reasons to think this might not be the case. One of the unique elements of her view, compared to other fiction views of models, is that models stand in for fictional stories rather than fictional characters. Rather than saying the Lotka-Volterra equations are comparable to Captain Ahab, we would say the Lotka-Volterra equations are like Moby Dick. Models are complex objects that involve a model description and model content. On Salis’ view, the description and content are distinct and only constitute a particular model when considered as a whole. Salis uses Kendall Walton’s prop theory of make-believe to connect truth claims to the fictional models. The model description is a prop, like the text of a novel, and provides an initial set of fictional truths. It consists of symbols that prescribe how something should be imagined in a particular context and is used to specify a particular model. The content of the model refers to the fictional truths that can be indirectly inferred from the description (Salis, 2021). This seems like a promising view to hold for both paradoxes. We feel emotions towards the characters based on the descriptions of what happens to them, just as the description of the model guides the fictional truths we can derive about them.
The second question addresses whether epistemic reactions are the right substitute for emotions. The paradox of scientific fiction was formulated with general language of “epistemic reactions” in an attempt not to bias it towards certain types of solution. However, I’m not convinced that different types of epistemic reactions are equally suitable. Consider gaining scientific knowledge versus scientific understanding. Knowledge has a much closer association with truth, which can create difficulties when dealing with fictional models. For example, consider a scientific model that incorporates significant idealizations, such as the ideal gas law. We know that gas molecules do not really behave as the model prescribes, but it still provides us with a greater understanding of how gasses behave. Sometimes scientific progress often requires us to make posits or assumptions that are “true enough” or even known to be false (Elgin, 2004; Potochnik, 2017, 2020).
The non-factive standard of understanding seems to be more in line with the literature regarding the fittingness of emotions than a factive standard would. (Scarantino & de Sousa, 2021; Currie 2014). Understanding generally involves discussions of “grasping” or some other reference to the understanding as a cognitive achievement of the individual (Elgin, 2004; Potochnik, 2017; Le Bihan, 2016). Likewise emotional fit distinguishes between the cognitive and strategic rationality. While it might not be cognitively fitting for me to have a certain emotional reaction towards a fiction, it could be strategically fitting, i.e., in the sense that it is in the agent’s best interest.
At this point, we have good reason to think the paradoxes are asking analogous questions. From here, the central question I want to consider is whether how we solve these paradoxes could give us good reason to believe artistic and scientific imagination are the same kind of activity. My general line of thinking is that resolving the paradoxes with a single solution would provide pro tanto reasons to believe the two kinds of imagining are the same kind of activity. On the other hand, if we think the solutions only apply to the paradox of fiction or the paradox of scientific fiction, then we would find pro tanto support to believe they are different activities.
I’m optimistic that both paradoxes can be resolved with the same solution. The standard approach is to reject the third premise, either by adopting a realist position towards fiction or arguing that belief is not a prerequisite for emotional reactions. Kendall Walton denies the first, claiming we feel quasi-emotions, not genuine ones, for fictional characters. Peter Langland-Hassan (2020) denies the second premise, arguing that we do believe that fictional characters exist within the context of the fiction. My plan for the project moving forward is to follow the standard approach and reject the third premise. In doing so, I plan to examine how the shift in philosophy of science from knowledge or truth towards understanding could also provide a blueprint for resolving the traditional paradox of fiction. That being said, I look forward to seeing other views regarding whether the two versions of the paradox press us to consider the same problem.
References
Cova, F., & Teroni, F. (2016). Is the paradox of fiction soluble in psychology? Philosophical Psychology, 29(6), 930–942. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1164306
Currie, G. (2014). Emotions fit for fiction. In S. Roeser & C. Todd (Eds.), Emotion and Value (pp. 146–166). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686094.003.0010
Elgin, C. Z. (2004). True enough*. Philosophical Issues, 14(1), 113–131. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00023.x
Frigg, R., & Nguyen, J. (2016). The fiction view of models reloaded. The Monist, 99(3), 225–242. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onw002
Langland-Hassan, P. (2020). Explaining imagination (First edition.). Oxford university press.
Le Bihan, S. (2016). Enlightening falsehoods: A modal view of scientific understanding. In Explaining Understanding (pp. 111–136). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315686110-7
Levy, A. (2012). Models, fictions, and realism: Two packages. Philosophy of Science, 79(5), 738–748. https://doi.org/10.1086/667992
Levy, A., & Godfrey-Smith, P. (2020). The scientific imagination: Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Oxford University press.
Potochnik, A. (2020). Idealization and Many Aims. Philosophy of Science, 87(5), 933–943. https://www-jstor-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/stable/48800964
— (2020). Idealization and many aims. Philosophy of Science, 87(5), 933–943. https://doi.org/10.1086/710622
Radford, C., & Weston, M. (1975). How can we be moved by the fate of anna karenina? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 49(1), 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/49.1.67
Salis, F. (2021). The new fiction view of models. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(3), 717–742. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axz015
Scarantino, A., & de Sousa, R. (2021). Emotion. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/emotion/
Thomasson, A. L. (2020). If models were fictions, then what would they be? In A. Levy & P. Godfrey-Smith (Eds.), The Scientific Imagination (1st ed., pp. 51–74). Oxford University PressNew York. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190212308.003.0003
Toon, A. (2010). Models as make-believe. In R. Frigg & M. Hunter (Eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science (pp. 71–96). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7_5
Walton, K. L. (1978). Fearing fictions. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(1), 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025831