The Mind’s Lazy Eye

A post by Tomer Ullman

Imagine the following in your mind’s eye, as vividly as you can:

A person walks into a room, and knocks a ball off a table.

Hold the image in your mind for a moment.

Now consider, for the image you conjured before you: Did you imagine the color of the ball? How about the person’s hair, or clothes, or perceived gender? Did you imagine the position of the person relative to the ball? Can you trace through the air the trajectory that the ball took?

If you’re like most people, your answer to some of these questions was ‘yes’, and some ‘no’. Although you could easily fill in details as needed, you did not bother thinking about some of these properties when creating the original scene.

And that’s kind of weird.

Non-commitment has been noted (under different names) in both philosophy and cognitive science. In philosophy, the discussion of the phenomenon started in perception, for example asking how you can know a hen is speckled, without knowing how many speckles it has (Ayer, 1940). Similar questions were then asked of scenes before our mind’s eye: One can imagine a striped tiger without knowing how many stripes it has, or a purple cow without knowing its shade of purple (Shorter, 1952; Block, 1983; Dennett, 1986, 1993, and see also more recent discussions in Nanay, 2015, 2016, and Kind, 2017).

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Vividness is a Nightmare

A post by Sean Riley

Brains are weird.  And minds are super confusing.  Some people are just out there minding their own business, and then bam!  Hallucination.  Something is there that isn’t actually there, and that’s weird.  Incredibly debilitating and tragic, yes, but also weird.  Even weirder is that we can do this intentionally.  You, right now, can sit pensively in your favourite chair and ask, “What would a giraffe in a necktie look like?”  And you can hem and haw and conjure a giant giraffe in your mind, wrapping the latest fashion around its neck, just below the jawline, only to take a moment’s pause and go, “Wait a second, that doesn’t look right...” So you quickly slide that tie straight down to the bottom of its neck, just like God intended.  That’s super weird.  Not the fashionable giraffe part, the other part.  The seeing part.  Surely there aren’t tiny giraffes chilling in your mind, so what are you actually seeing?  And why does it all look just a little bit “off,” if that is even the right word.  Imagery just seems different from perception in some way, and it’s difficult to say what that way is.  Vividness appears to play a role in this (e.g., Kind, 2017), but what even is vividness?  In many respects I think vividness is kind of like knowledge: we know it when we see it, but it’s a nightmare to define.  So let’s take a swing at it and see what happens to fall out.

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What does it mean to understand someone? Conference Report: “Can you imagine?!” The Role of Imagination in Understanding Others

A conference report by Serena Gregorio

It is a truism in our everyday thinking that interpersonal understanding is valuable. But what does it mean, exactly, to understand someone? This question drove the workshop “Can you imagine?!” The Role of Imagination in Understanding Others, held on September 26th and 27th, 2023 at the Justus Liebig Universität Giessen, as part of the DFG-funded research project Geist und Imagination. The guiding assumption was twofold: Understanding someone cannot be reduced to, nor exhaustively explained by, acquiring propositional knowledge of their mental states and rationalizing explanations of their actions in terms of causes. Simultaneously, the act of imaginatively re-enacting another person's perspective in a phenomenally rich way seems to be a promising approach to making sense of at least some cases of other-directed understanding. I’ll briefly summarize the talks by highlighting three main themes that emerged.

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How our brain distinguishes imagination and reality

A post by Nadine Dijkstra

Did you really just see something appear in the corner of your eye or was it just your imagination? For most of us, the difference between what we imagine and what we see seems very clear. However, the more we learn about the neuroscience of imagination, the more puzzling it is that we don’t confuse our internally generated experiences with reality more often.

Over the last decades, the development of neuroimaging methods suitable for use in humans - such as functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) and magneto- and electroencephalography (M/EEG) – have made it possible to actually look into people’s heads while they are imagining. This research has revealed that when we imagine something, many of the same brain areas get activated as when we perceive that same thing.

For example, when we imagine the face of a loved one, the same parts of the high-level fusiform gyrus – a brain area located in the lower lobe of the cortex, sitting close to ear level in the skull – become activated as when we would actually see that person in real life (Ishai, 2002; Ishai et al., 2000). Similarly, when we imagine alternating black and white lines of a certain orientation (i.e. ‘a grating stimulus’, the classical image used in visual neuroscience research), the low-level primary visual cortex (V1) – the neural entry point for signals coming from the eyes, located all the way at the back of the brain – becomes activated in a similar way as when we would actually see those same lines (Albers et al., 2013; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Rademaker et al., 2019). Dozens of neuroimaging studies have shown neural overlap between imagined and perceived stimuli of all kinds, from simple shapes and lines to objects to full scenes (for reviews, see Dijkstra et al., 2019; Pearson, 2019). This poses a fundamental question: given that the brain signals of imagery and perception are similar, how are we able to keep apart imagination and reality?

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Imagination from the First-Person Perspective, Possibility, and the Self

A post by Clas Weber

Imagine that not just the words you are reading right now on your screen are generated by a computer, but that everything you see, hear, smell, and feel is part of a hyper-detailed simulation created by a giant supercomputer. More shockingly, imagine that the stream of consciousness you are experiencing right now is itself generated by that computer. You yourself are part of the simulation.

Next, imagine that you wake up one morning and find yourself lying on an armour-like back. When you lift your head, you can see your brown belly, slightly domed and divided by arches into stiff sections. Your many legs, pitifully thin compared with the size of the rest of you, wave about helplessly, as you think: I have been transformed into a giant Kafkaesque beetle.

Finally, imagine that you are Napoleon riding a horse, looking out on the battlefield at Austerlitz, surveying your troops. You feel confident that you will win the imminent battle. In the next moment, you find yourself standing over Donald Trump, and next to Theresa May, Shinzo Abe, Emmanuel Macron, and other heads of states. You are no longer Napoleon. Now you are Angela Merkel, negotiating with other world leaders during a G7 meeting.

These prompts elicit a special form of imagination where we picture a scenario from the first-person perspective or from the inside. We simulate what it would feel like to be the subject at the centre of the scenario. They also show how flexible this form of imagination is: we can, it seems, imagine being avatars in a computer simulation, being members of a different species, or even being two different people successively.   

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It's nice and wise to fantasize

A post by Mathilde Cappelli

It is a striking fact that, while much work has been devoted to the nature, norms, and value of imagination, fantasy has received scarce attention. This may partly be because fantasy is often conceived of as a mere subcategory of imagination, from which not much can be learned (Cherry, 1985; Kershnar, 2005; Smuts, 2016). But inquiring into the nature, norms, and value of fantasy can shed light on many interrelated issues, from the nature of desire to that of pleasure and imagination. In this post, I will present some thoughts on the nature and value of fantasy.

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Children’s imagining about facts

A post by Anežka Kuzmičová

This is a research story, or the beginning of one, from a field other than most of the Junkyard. The field is literacy research – if we define literacy broadly enough. In the centre of this field is children’s imagining with varied texts and other stimuli (videos, spoken words, material objects), but studied differently from how it is studied in experimental research. My cross-disciplinary research group and I invite children to introspect, in the first person and their own words, rather than perform controlled tasks. The children’s introspection is supported with specially designed tangible props – picture cards, toys, colour-coded cutouts but also books. The idea behind such work is to deepen general understanding of children’s everyday experiences. We point out preexisting differences and groupings among children who otherwise tend to be treated as an experientially homogeneous population. We also revisit biases in the discourse and practice that affect children’s lives. One such bias is the general neglect of nonfiction as a springboard for imaginative activity, and the perception of young nonfiction readers as unimaginative individuals (Mar et al., 2006) or even non-readers (Mackey, 2020).

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Mental imagery and choreographic practices: a new avenue for the intention-motor interface

A post by Silvana Pani

“First thing to do is in your mind create a very simple, literal freehand sketch or drawing. [...] Choose a beginning on that sketch and then describe it physically or draw it – the whole thing rather than just an element of the whole thing.”
-- Wayne McGregor, choreographer

Choreography is one of the best examples of the hurdles and miracles of trying to put a plan into action. Over and above being a usually cooperative practice, choreography requires skilled coordination of verbal instructions with sensorimotor information. Verbal instructions are one main vehicle of the choreographer’s intentions and one way for dancers to think about movements. Sensorimotor information, on the other hand, is what verbal instructions are translated into and constrained by before and during movement performance.

From deliberation to actual enactment, the nature of thought processes underlying both skilled and ordinary bodily movements (like picking up a cup) is far from clear. Philosophers have often conceived of intentions as building blocks of plans. Our planning activity is thus responsible for deliberation and practical reasoning as well as for the preliminary rehearsal of actions (not all rehearsal of action happens at the planning level, though).

The idea that intentions are propositional states figuring in practical reasoning is a traditional platitude (e.g. Bratman 1987). The idea that motor representations, qua immediate antecedents of actions, are non-propositional in nature is a more recent view and quite widely accepted (e.g. Jeannerod 2006). The question of how differently formatted contents, that is, contents that are propositionally and motorically formatted come together towards the realization of some action goal or set of goals, such as a new choreographic work, has been dubbed the “Interface challenge” by Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014).

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The thirst for imagination

A post by Margherita Arcangeli

Sometimes it is a good time to take stock: at the end of the year, when some anniversary is coming up, but also after a long summer break.

I have been recently prompted to reflect on what has been done on imagination over the last few years: an impressive amount of work! Trying to summarise what scholars have recently written about the imagination may seem like trying to empty the sea with a spoon: an impossible and vain task. So I started to look for a useful compass to navigate the growing literature, and a powerful analogy advanced by Anna Abraham in the concluding note to The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination gave me a hint. She points out that imagination bears striking similarities with water:

“Imagination can manifest in wildly different forms from the tangible to the intangible. Its workings range from calm and predictable to volatile and unpredictable. It is a fundamental part of our physiological make-up, permeating our very being, and it is essential to our mental life. It is nourishing and constructive yet can also be overwhelming and destructive. It is quiet. It is dogged. It shapes. It wields. It fits. It flows. It pushes against fault lines. It breaks away. It lacks definition, yet it is formidable.” (Abraham 2020: 814)

I realized that comparing imagination to water can help us see different attitudes scholars have taken, and may take, towards it. At least three categories can be recognised: 1) imagination chemists, 2) imagination engineers, and 3) “imaginographers”.

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Conference Report “How Does It Feel? Interpersonal Understanding and Affective Empathy”

A Conference Report by Christiana Werner

The conference “Interpersonal Understanding and Affective Empathy” in Liverpool, held June 26-28 2023, was the final conference of the DFG/AHRC-project with the same title as the conference.  The German part of the project was located at the University of Duisburg-Essen with Neil Roughley, Katharina Sodoma, and Christiana Werner. On the English side of the project were Thomas Schramme and Elizabeth Ventham at the University of Liverpool. At the conference, the four members of the project presented their recent work related to the project. There were also presentations by four invited guests: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College), Yujia Song (Salisbury University), Antti Kaupinnen (University of Helsinki), and Monika Betzler (LMU Munich).

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Summer Hiatus

Your favorite imagination blog will be taking its usual summer hiatus for the next couple of months. We wish all of our friends of imagination a restful and fruitful summer break, and we look forward to bringing you more excellent content in late August.

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Misery Enough, No Poetry

A post by Nicholas Whittaker

There is something important in the oxymoronism implicit in the phrase “the black avant-garde.” A well-meaning reader (or one clutching tightly to their purported “antiracism”) will chafe at the suggestion that “blackness” and “avant-garde” become paradoxical when conjoined. The easiest way to resist it is to generate examples. Take, say, Julius Eastman, or Adrian Piper; M. Nourbese Phillip, Amiri Baraka; Alice Coltrane, Bill Gunn; Ben Patterson, Nathaniel Mackey; Cecil Taylor, Julie Dash. Such luminaries seem to uncontroversially occupy the place in art history generally reserved for the likes of Marcel Duchamp and John Cage, David Lynch and Gertrude Stein. If the black avant-garde is an incoherent concept, why can we list so many examples with such ease?

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Ignorance as Imaginative Resistance

A post by K. Bailey Thomas

In this post I provide a brief account of imaginative resistance that is rooted in ignorance. To be clear: here, and throughout the piece, I am referring to ignorance as ideology unless otherwise specified. This means I am considering facets and manifestations of ignorance that are not accidental or blameless but are manufactured specifically to harm others. This thought piece is inspired by my current manuscript-in-progress wherein I am exploring how ignorance is an essential building block in the construction of oppressive resistant imaginations. I am particularly interested in examining how our current understanding of ignorance relies too heavily on presumptions of innocence on behalf of epistemic agents, which allows an immediate association of ignorance with one being not at fault or responsible for their actions. By the end of this piece, I hope to provide a generative account of how what I call “Insidious Ignorance” remains a core component in both the construction and maintenance of resistant imaginations, resulting in various social, ethical, and epistemic harms.

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Conference Report: Stanford Imagination Workshop

A conference report by Avshalom Schwartz and Alicia Steinmetz

In recent years, imagination has become a renewed topic of interest for political philosophers. While political and philosophical concern with the imagination has a long history within Western thought, it has tended to be a marginal or ignored topic in contemporary political theory, in part due to the dominance of analytic moral philosophy and Kantian-inspired models of deliberation and public reasoning over the past few decades.

However, various developments in the early twenty-first century – such as the rise of new digital communication technologies, democratic backsliding, and new voices and strategies in political activism – have placed imagination back on the agenda of political philosophers. So far, many of these new explorations of the politics of imagination (and the imagination of politics) have occurred in isolation from each other. 

The Stanford Imagination Workshop, organized by Avshalom Schwartz and Alicia Steinmetz with the generous support of the Stanford Humanities Center, The Zephyr Institute, and the Transformation of Democracy Workshop, was envisioned as an attempt to provide scholars a formal and institutional opportunity to converse and exchange ideas.

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Looking for a Non-Representational Enactivist Imagining in the Junkyard of the Imagination: (it may not be there)

A post by Janine Jones

There seems to be a general consensus that imagining — sometimes thought of as seeing with the mind’s eye — is inherently representational. How could re-presenting to ‘the mind’s eye’ what is not present fail to involve a representation of that which is presently absent. Isn’t such a form of representation at the heart of what it is to imagine?

In this post, I take advantage of the bounteous nature of junkyards. I participate in a form of engagement that both philosophy and junkyards invite:  wondering and wandering. I wonder as I wander through the junkyard trying to imagine how what I am trying to imagine could be in the junkyard. I am trying to discover a type of imagining, in the junkyard, that bears representational constituents (perhaps even necessarily so), but which is, itself, non-representational, at least at the non-sub-personal level.

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What Is Mental Imagery Good For? Mental Rotation in Aphantasia as A Case Study

A post by Jorge Morales

“I just learned something about you and it is blowing my [expletive] mind. This is not a joke. [...] It is, I think, as close to an honest-to-goodness revelation as I will ever live in the flesh. Here it is: You can visualize things in your mind.” 

Blake Ross, Mozilla Firefox Co-Founder, April 2016

Late one night, Blake Ross discovered something incredible (as in almost impossible to believe): other people had visual imagery! Like Ross, a surprisingly large number of people (about 3-5% of the population) have aphantasia, which is characterized as the lack of mental imagery.

Seeing things in the mind’s eye is an important faculty during development, in art and science, and it has a tight relation to cognitive skills such as mental simulation, short-term memory and mental rotation, among many others (Pearson et al., 2015). Despite this, aphantasics do not seem to suffer from any noticeable deficit. Blake Ross founded Mozilla without even realizing he was aphantasic (or those close to him noticing anything was amiss). Millions more live oblivious of how different their mental imagery skills are (Lupyan et al., 2023).

But how can this be? One possible implication is that imagination—and perhaps even consciousness in general—is not as useful as we might think: people do not even notice when this entire faculty is absent! This, of course, goes against common sense and millennia of research. Philosophers have discussed the importance of imagination at least since Plato (Bundy, 1922; Schwartz, 2020) and Aristotle (1993), scientists have studied it and its effects for more than a hundred years (e.g., Kosslyn, 1980, 1996; Perky, 1910; Shepard & Cooper, 1982), and most of us seem to use it all the time. Could mental imagery be more epiphenomenal than we thought?

To address this question, I will focus on mental rotation and aphantasia as a case study. I will pose more questions than answers, but in the end, we may see that whatever the function of mental imagery during mental rotation is, it must be an incredibly subtle one.

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Salzburg Workshop on Imagistic Cognition: Some Intersecting Themes

A conference report by Amy Kind

How do we distinguish imagination and reality?  How do visual content and social context influence pictorial meaning?  What role does mental imagery play in belief?  And how do you make room in your refrigerator when you need to fit in a bunch of leftovers after a large social gathering?  These are just a few of the many questions addressed at the Second Salzburg Workshop on Imagistic Cognition, held last week.  Organized by Christopher Gauker (University of Salzburg) and Bence Nanay (Antwerp) as part of their Puzzle of Imagistic Cognition project (jointly funded by the Austrian FWF and the Belgian FWO), the workshop brought together 12 speakers drawn from disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience for three days of productive dialogue about the nature and extent of imagistic cognition.

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Book Symposium: Dunin-Kozicka Commentary and Reply

This week at The Junkyard we’re hosting a symposium on Piotr Kozak’s recent book: Thinking in Images: Imagistic Cognition and Non-propositional Content. On Monday, we began with an introduction from Piotr Kozak. Commentaries follow Tuesday through Thursday.

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Can we be creative in using rulers and thinking in images?

And why even ask such an odd question? First, any time when we use rulers we recreate an old simple procedure — we apply the ruler to the thing to be measured and read the standardized measurement results. We are substantially uncreative then. Second, when we think in images our chances to come up with something new are good — for not only can we operate with images in many ways (e.g. rotating them, combining them, seeing them from a different perspective) but we can also arrive at a new image as a result of such operations. Indeed, we can be original when thinking in images. Why even put rulers and images together in this question then?

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Book Symposium: Rucińska Commentary and Reply

This week at The Junkyard we’re hosting a symposium on Piotr Kozak’s recent book: Thinking in Images: Imagistic Cognition and Non-propositional Content. On Monday, we began with an introduction from Piotr Kozak. Commentaries follow Tuesday through Thursday.

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Piotr Kozak’s Thinking in Images is an insightful book that deals with some of the most fundamental questions regarding imagistic thinking, including: a) what is thinking?; b) what are images?; and c) what, specifically, is thinking with images?

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Book Symposium: Tooming Commentary and Reply

This week at The Junkyard we’re hosting a symposium on Piotr Kozak’s recent book: Thinking in Images: Imagistic Cognition and Non-propositional Content. On Monday, we began with an introduction from Piotr Kozak. Commentaries follow Tuesday through Thursday.

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Thinking in Images is a rich and elaborate book that defends a view that images play an indispensable role in thinking as measurement devices. In articulating that view, Kozak covers a lot of ground by critically engaging with a wide range of literature and carving out new paths in the theoretical landscape.

Inevitably, this short commentary cannot to justice to the wealth of detail in Kozak’s book. For instance, the reader can find there a fascinating discussion of the representational role of knot diagrams and black hole pictures. The book also presents an innovative account of recognition-based identification in terms of construction invariants. These are just a couple of examples of what the book offers but that I don’t have space to discuss here.

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